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Yoon: Sanctioning Insurance Carriers for Bad-Faith Litigation Practices

NOTE
SANCTIONING INSURANCE CARRIERS FOR
BAD-FAITH LITIGATION PRACTICES:
A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE "NAMED
PARTY" RULE

I.

INTRODUCTION

It was three days before Christmas in 1996. Earnest and Eleanor
Brown, a retired couple from Shinnston, West Virginia, were driving on
the freeway. The retired couple had twenty-two children, seventeen of
whom were adopted, many of them with special needs. As they were
driving home, a drunken man in a Mustang swerved into their lane and
collided with their car. As a result of the accident, Mr. Brown suffered a
concussion and Mrs. Brown seriously fractured her ankle, leaving
doctors with doubt as to whether she would ever be able to walk again.
Eleanor Brown's ankle ' was eventually held together with "a plate, two
screws and three wires."
Due to her serious injuries, Eleanor Brown had grave difficulty
carrying out her ordinary daily activities. Her ability to give her
seventeen special-needs children the attention they required was
impaired. Mrs. Brown was forced to climb the stairs in her home in a
sitting position, one step at a time. In addition to her physical
impediments, she also suffered financial problems. As her medical bills
began to accumulate, her medical insurer denied coverage because it felt
that the "driver who caused the accident" should be responsible for the
medical bills.

2

Unfortunately, both the Browns and the drunk driver were insured
by the same carrier, State Farm Insurance Company. The insurer offered
to pay a mere $10,000 of the medical bills the Browns incurred, the
1. Scott Finn, A Question of Bad Faith: Third-party Lawsuits Called Consumer Tool and
Legal Club, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Feb. 27, 2005, at lB.

2. Id.

1531
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amount covered under Mrs. Brown's policy. The drunk driver who was
liable for the accident had much higher insurance coverage, but it was
apparent to Mrs. Brown that State Farm refused to acknowledge this fact
3
and did not want to tap into his insurance policy coverage.
It was at this point that Mrs. Brown hired an attorney. As a result,
the insurance carrier offered Mrs. Brown $100,000, the amount covered
under the drunk driver's insurance policy. In exchange, State Farm
wanted the drunk driver released from all liability. The Browns rejected
the offer, however, because they feared their medical bills would accrue
to an amount in excess of the offer made. The Browns requested an
advance payment in order to be able to pay some of the medical bills,
but the company refused. Consequently, Ernest and Eleanor Brown filed
a lawsuit for the insurer's bad faith, which prompted the insurance
4
carrier to settle the case for an amount in excess of $200,000.
While many critics of bad-faith claims, which result in substantial
monetary judgments against insurers, call this "jackpot justice," the
Browns felt that they would not have received a fair settlement if a badfaith action had never been filed.5 Furthermore, notwithstanding
Eleanor's ultimate settlement, one cannot contend that she hit a
"jackpot." Because of the insurer's refusal to settle in good faith, in
addition to her mental anguish, Eleanor Brown's "credit was destroyed
and her life disrupted ' 6 by the unnecessary litigation. The judicial
system was used as a "bargaining chip" to effectuate a just result.
This is not an unusual scenario. Insurance carriers have been known
to exercise bad faith when third-party claims are brought against their
policyholders. 7 The Brown case is just one example of this unfortunate
bad-faith conduct of insurers. However, the remedies currently available
in most jurisdictions to policyholders who are injured by an insurer's
8
bad faith are often expensive, time consuming, and impracticable.
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") provides
that the rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 9 This rule has

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.

9.

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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been mirrored in many state jurisdictions'0 and is the centerpiece of civil
litigation. However, this rule is often forgotten by civil litigants.
Courts often consider many matters that involve both parties and
non-parties. However, the written laws and rules that guide civil actions
in both federal and state courts only lead to the resolution of claims
involving "parties."1 For example, FRCP Rule 11 provides that a court
may impose sanctions on "attorneys, law firms or parties" that defend
claims frivolously.1 2 Without this option of judicially imposed sanctions,
civil actions would be unjust, time consuming and often very expensive
for those forced to defend the adversaries' non-meritorious claims. The
unavailability of judicially imposed sanctions may lead to much
confusion in the insurance company context.' 3 It is often the case that the
defendant's insurance company, who is a non-party, has more control
over litigating the civil cases. 14 The named parties in such cases may be
no more than innocent bystanders.
Insurance carriers are a prime example of this contention. While
civil claims are brought against their policyholders, the insurance
carriers, who are not named as parties to the action, generally have sole
control over the litigation of the claims. 15 Insurance carriers have two
obligations: the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend civil claims
against their policyholders.' 6 Additionally, they have an implied
fiduciary duty to defend in "good faith"' 7 when the claim is covered

10.

See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-102 (1994) ("The provisions of this act shall be liberally

construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.010 (2003) ("This code ... shall be construed to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 104 (McKinney
2003) ("The civil practice law and rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and

inexpensive determination of every civil judicial proceeding.").
11. Jeffrey A. Parness & Tait J. Lundgren, Nonparty Insurers in Federal Civil Actions: The
Needfor New Written Civil Procedure Laws, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 191 (2003).

12. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Some states have similar statutes providing for the imposition of
sanctions on parties. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2011(C) (West 1993) ("[T]he court
shall.., impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties ... responsible for
the violation."); UTAH R. Civ. P. 1 (c) (2005) ("[T]he court may... impose an appropriate sanction
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties.. . responsible for the violation.").
13. See Pamess & Tait, supra note 11, at 191-92.
14. See Cindie Keegan McMahon, Annotation, Duty of Liability Insurer to Initiate Settlement
Negotiations, 51 A.L.R.5th 701, § 2 (1997).
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1531

under the insurance policy,18 or to settle within the contractual limits of
the insurance policy when there is no viable defense.1 9
The duty to settle flows from the insurance carrier's contractual
duties 20 and the legal system's overarching goal to keep civil actions
"just, speedy, and inexpensive, 21 for all claimants. However, insurance
carriers do not always abide by these duties that are imposed on them. In
fact, sometimes carriers have economic incentives for avoiding the
timely settlement of claims and advancing with litigation instead.22
An insurer's decision to breach may lead to a plethora of harms
imposed on a policyholder who was relying on the carrier's duty to
indemnify, defend, or settle claims against her. For example, a
policyholder may be subject to pay damages in excess of the insurance
policy when a settlement could have been effectuated well within the
bounds of the policy limit. 23 A policyholder may be forced to expend
needless and extensive funds by bringing suit against an insurance
carrier for exposing her to a judgment in excess of the policy limits. 24 A
policyholder may have her life disrupted and credit destroyed because of
an insurer's bad-faith refusal to settle the claim for a reasonable
amount.2 5
Insurance policyholders who have been wrongly subjected to
unwarranted or excess liability because of an insurance carrier's
unreasonable refusal to settle claims against them may have remedies
available. They may successfully bring causes of action in tort or for
breach of contract. 26 However, these claims cannot arise until a full trial
has been completed and a verdict is rendered against the policyholders in
excess of the original insurance policy coverage.2 7 Thus, the judicial

18.

Andrew Janquitto, Insurer's Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 3-4

(1988); Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer'sDuty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221, 222 (1997).
19. See McMahon, supra note 14, at § 7; see also Mendota Elec. Co. v. N.Y. Indem. Co., 211
N.W. 317, 318-19 (Minn. 1926).
20. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1117-27 (1990).
21.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

22.

John N. Ellison et al., Bad Faith and Punitive Damages: The Policyholder'sGuide to Bad

Faith Insurance Coverage Litigation-Understandingthe Available Recovery Tools, SJ099 A.L.I.-

A.B.A. 235, 237 (2004).
23. See, e.g., Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.2d 471, 474, 476-77 (1976);
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 133, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
24. See Bedoya v. I11.
Founders Ins. Co., 688 N.E.2d 757, 759-60 (111.
App. Ct. 1997).
25. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
26.

See RICHARD A. LORD, INSURER'S RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO SETTLE CLAIM AGAINST

INSURED, 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:105 (4th ed. 2000).
27. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss4/8

4

Yoon: Sanctioning Insurance Carriers for Bad-Faith Litigation Practices
2006]

SANCTIONING INSURANCE CARRIERS

28
goal to have civil cases determined in a "just, speedy and inexpensive"
manner is frustrated.
Notwithstanding the fact that such causes of action are available to
insurance policyholders, judicial efficiency is nevertheless threatened
because they may ultimately result in trial. Causes of action arising from
an insurance carrier's wrongful refusal to settle waste the court's time
and the litigant's money. This additional litigation could easily be
avoided by an insurer's good-faith attempt to settle the case or by the
judicial imposition of sanctions on the insurance carrier for its
unreasonable refusal to do so.
Few courts have imposed sanctions on insurance carriers who
frivolously refused to settle when there was no viable defense.29
However, this Note proposes that this rule should be considered and
adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. Allowing courts to impose
sanctions on "non-parties" such as insurance carriers, the real parties in
interest in civil litigation, would result in a more efficient judicial
system, conserving time and money for all those involved.
Part II of this Note will look at the purpose of insurance carriers,
their rights, and the duties they owe to policyholders. This Part will
explore the difference between the contractual, statutory, and fiduciary
duties, and what each duty entails. Furthermore, it will assess insurance
carriers' role in the litigation process, probing whether they can and
should be considered the real parties in interest for all purposes of
litigation, including the imposition of sanctions.
Part III will examine the possible causes of action that may arise
out of the insurer's breach of its several duties and will examine the
definition of "bad faith." Part III will discuss whether insurers have a
reasonable duty to settle claims, although the carrier's money and assets
are at stake. Additionally, it will analyze cases based on an insurer's bad
faith, the implications of such misconduct and the possibility of the
insurance carrier's reluctance to settle as a result of the policyholder's
bad faith in insurance claims.
In Part IV, this Note will evaluate the possible economic incentives
insurance carriers have for choosing not to settle and instead prolonging
litigation. In addition, it will discuss the externalities imposed on the
judicial system by the insurer's refusal to settle claims in a timely and

28.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

29. See, e.g., Saastomoinen v. Pagano, 183 Misc. 2d 781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 278
A.D.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (sanctions imposed by trial court reversed on appeal); Patitucci
v. Laverty, No. 2107, 1989 WL 817175 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 15, 1989), rev'd,576 A.2d 992 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (sanctions imposed by trial court reversed on appeal).
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reasonable manner while exploring how certain jurisdictions have
handled this very issue resulting in conflicting decisions. This Part will
balance the costs and benefits to the insurance carriers and to the
community as a whole.
Part V will conclude with the possible solution of judicial power to
sanction insurance carriers. This Part will assert that the public policy of
having an efficient, just, and trustworthy judicial process far outweighs
any economic benefits conferred by the prolonging of litigation by
insurers' refusals to settle claims. It will assert that public policy
demands that a stronger check be placed on insurance carriers who try to
escape their duties under the insurance contracts possibly avoiding
liability.
II.

INSURANCE CARRIERS MUST INDEMNIFY POLICYHOLDERS FOR
CLAIMS COVERED UNDER THEIR INSURANCE POLICIES:
THE PURPOSE OF INSURANCE

Insurance is a contract between parties where a policyholder pays a
premium in consideration of the insurer's guarantee to indemnify3 ° the
policyholder against unforeseeable or contingent harms. 3' The guarantee
of indemnification is the most important reason, possibly the sole reason,
most people obtain insurance policies. In general, parties obtain
insurance policies under the premise that being insured is more
beneficial than being uninsured.32 However, an insurance policy is
unlike the traditional contract.33
Ordinarily, an "opportunistic breach" of contract would be
permissible, and in some instances even commendable. 34 Nevertheless,
insurance contracts do not carry the same implications. There is no such
30. "Indemnify" means "[t]o reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third party's
or one's own act or default," or "[t]o give (another) security against such a loss." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 783-84 (8th ed. 2004).
31. See Auto. Funding Group v. Garamendi, 114 Cal. App. 4th 846, 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
Why
Companies
Sell
Insurance,
32. See
Economics
of
Insurance:
http://userweb.port.ac.uk/-fyshd/eoi/wcsi.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Economics of
Insurance].
33. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 239.
34. See id. at 239. In an action where an "opportunistic breach" (a "breach designed to take
advantage of the vulnerable promisee") has been effectuated, recovery is limited to consequential
damages "to foster efficient breaches." Id.at 240. A breach of contract can be efficient when both
parties to the contract are better off as a result of the breach, even after the breaching party has fully
compensated the non-breaching party. Id. at 239. Thus, in some situations, there are incentives for
parties to breach a contract. See David W. Barnes, The Meaning of Value in ContractDamages and
Contract Theory, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1,2-4 (1996).
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thing as an opportunistic breach of an insurance contract. 35 Though
breaching the contract may benefit the insurer, the policyholder is almost
always harmed when an insurer breaches its contract. 36 Because insurers
have an incentive to breach their contracts at the expense of the
policyholders, the underlying purpose of the insurance contract 37 is
undermined.38
During the 2005 hurricane season, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane
Rita brought massive devastation to various regions of the United States.
In light of these recent tragedies, insurers' attempts to avoid making
payments to their policyholders were widely reported.3 9 Insurance
carriers have sought to rely on the language of the policies, but have not
been very successful. 40 Although there were disputes as to whether
damage was caused by "flooding, wind or wind-blown rain," possible
negative publicity has been a driving force, encouraging insurers to pay
the claims. 4 1 As a result, private insurers are likely to make payouts to
Hurricane Katrina victims because the federal government only provides
for minimal flood coverage.4 2
This is an example of the reluctance exhibited by the insurance
carriers to pay out or settle claims. This unwillingness to abide by their
insurance contracts can also be seen in civil litigation. Due to the
insurance carriers' refusal to settle claims where there is no viable
defense, insurers are often subject to needless litigation, and possibly
additional liability, after the initial suit is over. However, insurers do not
seem to be bothered by additional litigation.4 3 Insurers spend substantial
time in court, and often bring suits against their own policyholders, to
litigate whether the claims are in fact covered, in an attempt to avoid
payment pursuant to their insurance policies.44

35. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 239.
36. See id. at 240.
37. It is common knowledge that the insurance carrier has the responsibility to indemnify
policyholders by making a payment on their behalf for a claim covered in the policy in exchange for
the premiums paid.
38. See id. at 241-42; see also Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 335, 377-78 (1998).
39. See Jeff French, An Inflection Pointfor Cat Bonds; After Katrina, Investors May Face
Losses on Principalforthe FirstTime, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Sept. 12, 2005.

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 247.
44. Id.
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Insurance Carriers'Duties Are Twofold.- The Duty to
Defend and the Duty to Settle in "Good Faith"

Insurance carriers have two important duties that underlie their very
purpose to indemnify their policyholders. First, insurance carriers have
the duty to reasonably defend claims against the insured.4 5 Second,
insurance carriers have the duty to settle within policy limits when no
viable defense exists. 46 The duty to defend and the duty to settle in good
faith often overlap. Insurers must make a good faith determination as to
the merits of their defense and proceed accordingly. Insurance carriers
have a "good faith" duty because of their relationship to the policyholder
and their role in the litigation process.47 Once a claim is brought against
a policyholder, the insurance carrier has exclusive control over all parts
of the litigation, including settlement.48
1. Insurance Carrier's "Right" to Defend is Often Waived
The duty to defend is an insurance carrier's right.4 9 Insurers often
desire to defend the claims against policyholders who are covered under
the policy because the carriers' financial interests are also at stake.5 °
However, insurers in many instances have breached their duties to
defend and indemnify, bringing suit against their policyholders (mostly
declaratory judgment actions) in an attempt to avoid liability and fight
coverage under the policies.5 1
Some jurisdictions have recognized insurers' "vexatious" refusals
to settle and have provided some remedies for injured parties.5 2 In
45. See, e.g., N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. § 13-1703 (West 2005) ("An insurance
company acts in bad faith in refusing to defend a claim if the terms of the insurance policy do not
provide a reasonable basis for the refusal."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.21 (West 2005) ("No
insurance company issuing a policy of automobile or motor vehicle liability insurance shall be
relieved of its contractual obligation to defend its insured against any claim on the basis of coverage
for such claim being provided by any other policy, unless the insurer of such other policy has
assumed and is performing the obligation to provide such defense.").
46. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
47. 1d; see also infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text.
48. Id.

49. See Randall, supra note 18, at 261.
50.
51.

See id.
See Ellison, supra note 22, at 247.

52. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/155(l) (West 2004) ("In any action by or against
a company wherein there is in issue the liability of a company on a policy or policies of insurance or
the amount of the loss payable thereunder, or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it
appears to the court that such action or delay is vexatious andunreasonable,the court may allow as

part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorney fees [and] other costs.") (emphasis added).
In Missouri, the state statute provides that:
In any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any loss under a

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss4/8
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Bedoya v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co., 53 the plaintiff brought an
action against the insurer for the "vexatious and unreasonable" breach of
its duty to defend under its policy. 54 In the underlying suit, the plaintiff,
a cafd owner, was sued by a woman who had allegedly been assaulted
and raped by an unknown patron of the establishment.5 5 One of the
56
claims of the complaint was made pursuant to the "Dram Shop Act.
The insurance carrier was supposed to cover the insured from liability
incurred by the Dram Shop Act. However, the insurer breached its duty
to defend the plaintiff and only settled one count of the underlying multiobligation to
count lawsuit. 57 The insurer contended that it only had the
58
policy.
the
under
covered
clearly
were
that
defend claims
Disagreeing with the insurer's contention, the court held that, since
it was well-established in the State of Illinois that "the duty to defend
extends to cases where the complaint alleges several causes of action or
theories of recovery against an insured, one of which is within the
coverage of [the] policy, '59 the insurer had a duty to defend every count
of the underlying suit.60 The insurance company was sanctioned, ordered
to pay the insured for the injury suffered, and estopped from raising a
non-coverage defense to liability as a result of its failure to defend in the
underlying suit. 6' Though the trial court's imposition of attorney's fees
pursuant to the vexatious refusal to settle was upheld, the judicial
sanctions imposed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 were
not.62 The court held that no proper explanation was provided by the trial

policy... except automobile liability insurance, if it appears from the evidence that such
company has refused to pay such loss without reasonable cause or excuse, the court or
jury may, in addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow the plaintiff
damages ... and a reasonable attorney's fee; and the court shall enter judgment for the
aggregate sum found in the verdict.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (West 2005).
53. 688 N.E.2d 757 (I11.App. Ct. 1997).
54. Id. at 760.
55. Id. at 759.
56. A "dram-shop act" is "[a] statute allowing a plaintiff to recover damages from a
commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for the plaintiffs injuries caused by a customer's
intoxication." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (8th ed. 2004).
57. Bedoya, 688 N.E.2d at 760.
58. Id. at 761.
59. See id. at 761 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24 (Il1. 1984)).
60. Id.at 762.
61. See id. at 760-63.
62. Id. at 765. Under this rule, the reasons for the sanctions imposed must be stated with
specificity. See ILL. SuP. CT. R. 137. Though this statute allows courts to impose sanctions on
insurance carriers, these sanctions are applicable to insurers who have been named in the suit; it
does not appear that sanctions under this statute are applicable to insurance carriers who have
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court in imposing the sanctions.63 Nonetheless, the court did note that the

record contained sufficient evidence of the defendant insurance carrier
filing papers with "blatantly incorrect legal analysis.

64

2.

Failure to Settle in "Good Faith" Results in Excessive
Litigation
Although insurers often do feel compelled to defend suits against
their policyholders because it is the carrier's assets that are at stake, this
compulsion does not carry over to their good-faith duty to settle.

Generally, a cause of action for an insurance carrier's failure to settle a
claim in good faith may be encountered when the following four
elements are satisfied. 65 First, a settlement offer must have been made by
the claimant. 66 Second, the offer made must have been within the policy
limit.67 Third, no viable defense must be available for the policyholder
68
that would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
Finally, there must be a plaintiffs verdict at the conclusion of trial in
excess of the insurance policy subsequent to the insurance carrier's
refusal to settle.69 However, these four factors are not the only instances
in which a cause of action for bad-faith failure to settle may occur.70

exclusive control over the defense of lawsuits against their policyholders who are often not named
in the cause of action.
63. Bedoya, 688 N.E.2d at 765.
64. Id.
65. See generally Freeman v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 58 S.W.3d 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that an insurer owes a duty to settle after four criteria are met).
66. See, e.g., id. at 598-99. Some courts do not require this element. See infra Part II.A.4.
67. See Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 9 (Cal. 2000) ("An insurer
that breaches its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by unreasonably refusing to accept a
settlement offer within policy limits may be held liable for the full amount of the judgment against
the insured in excess of its policy limits.") (citing Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d 1038 (Cal. 1980)); see also Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840
P.2d 130, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[A]n insurer owes its insured a duty to accept an offer of
settlement within the policy limits when there is a substantial likelihood of a judgment being
rendered against the insured in excess of those limits.") (citing Larraburu Bros. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
604 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1979)).
68. This is an integral part of the test. See Northfield Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins.
Co., 545 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Minn. 1996) (stating that Minnesota requires that the policyholder be
"clearly liable before the insurer may suffer liability for breach of its duty of good faith").
69. See Mendota Elec. Co. v. N.Y. Indem. Co., 211 N.W. 317, 318-19 (Minn. 1926) (stating
that in order for the insurance carrier to avoid liability, the insurer must believe in good faith that the
proposed settlement figure was greater than what a jury would award in damages, even if it is
certain that the insured policyholder is liable).
70. See Freeman v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 58 S.W.3d 590, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that a breach of duty to settle must allege four elements: "(1) the insurer's assumption of control
over negotiation and settlement and legal proceedings brought against the insured; (2) a demand by
the insured that the insurer settle the claim; (3) the insurer's refusal to settle the claim within the
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Various jurisdictions apply different standards in establishing
comparable causes of action.7" A finding of bad faith may be tantamount
to a finding that the insurance carrier breached its fiduciary duty to the
policyholder.72
In Knobloch v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.,7 3 the insurer was

subject to subsequent litigation and additional liability for its bad-faith
refusal to settle the claims against its policyholders when it had an
opportunity to do so. Knobloch, a policyholder of Royal Globe
Insurance Company, was the plaintiff in this action. The claim in the
underlying suit, where Knobloch was one of two defendants, was
covered under Knobloch's insurance policy. The insurance carrier
refused, in bad faith, to settle a claim brought against Knobloch in the
underlying suit. As a result, Knobloch brought this action against the
insurance carrier. 74
The underlying suit, which led to this subsequent litigation, was
based on a one-car accident where Knobloch was the driver. The car was
owned by Knobloch's mother, the second defendant in the underlying
action. Wickman, the passenger and plaintiff in the underlying suit, was
seriously injured when Knobloch's car overturned. Several attempts
were made by Wickman's attorney to settle the case within the policy
limit of $10,000. Nevertheless, Royal Globe Insurance Company failed
to make a reasonable settlement offer, despite the fact that Wickman's
75
injuries were substantial and the claim was covered under the policy.

Knobloch was dissatisfied with the attorney provided to him by the
insurer and retained independent counsel to protect his personal
interests. Knobloch's independent counsel made settlement offers in
excess of the insurance policy in addition to the insurer's offer in the
entire amount of the insurance policy. However, it was too late; these
offers were declined by Wickman's attorney who decided to litigate the
matter. At trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Wickman in the
amount of $75,383.50, an amount more than seven times the insurance

liability limits of the policy, and (4) proof that the insurer acted in bad faith, rather than
negligently") (citing Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990));
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 796-97 (Utah 1985) (involving a policyholder who
brought a claim against its own insurance carrier for failing to settle his claim in good faith).
71.

See generally infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.

72. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 278 ("In any bad faith insurance coverage litigation,
emphasize that the fiduciary duties of insurance companies and the public interest nature explains
why companies must place policyholders' interests before their own.").
73.

38N.Y.2d471 (1976).

74. Id.at 474.
75.

Id. at 471,474-75.
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policy. The insurance carrier only paid $10,000. Thus, the two
76
defendants were obligated to split the judgment in excess of the policy.
Knobloch subsequently brought an action against Royal Globe
Insurance Company for its bad-faith failure to settle the underlying claim
within the policy limits. Due to the insurer's refusal to settle, the insured
was exposed to excess liability, and a jury verdict was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff for $30,236.50 in excess of the insurance policy.
Litigation did not end there, however. The insurance carrier, displeased
with the jury's verdict, appealed on the ground that the judge wrongly
instructed the jury and was successful in getting the verdict reversed.
However, on final appeal, the New York State Court of Appeals
ultimately reinstated the jury verdict and held that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude that the insurance carrier had acted in
bad faith.77
3. Insurer Owes a Fiduciary Duty Only to Its Policyholders
In Beck v. Kelly,78 the plaintiff sought to appeal a directed verdict
entered in favor of the defendant insurer, in an action brought for the
insurance carrier's alleged failure to settle within policy limits. 79 The
court held that an insurance carrier cannot be liable for failing to settle a
claim in good faith against its policyholder if no clear offer for
80
settlement was made by the claimant.
Plaintiff William Beck was struck and seriously injured by the
policyholder's automobile while standing at a bus stop. State Farm, the
defendant, began negotiations with Beck's attorneys in an effort to settle
the case within the policy limits of $10,000. However, State Farm never
received a response either accepting or rejecting its settlement offer. At
trial, the jury rendered a verdict of $45,000 in excess of the insurance
policy. After trial, defendant State Farm only paid $10,000-the amount
of the policy limit.8 '
Seeking the satisfaction of the entire judgment, the plaintiff brought
this action against State Farm to recover the amount in excess of the
insurance policy. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount of $45,000. In spite of this, the trial judge entered judgment for

76. Id. at 475-77.
77. Id.at 476-77.
78.

323 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).

79. Id. at668.
80. Id. at 669.
81. Id. at 668.
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State Farm, granting a motion for directed verdict which had been
reserved before the jury verdict was rendered.82
On appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed. The appellate
court recognized that an insurer may be held liable for wrongfully
refusing to settle claims in bad faith for the amount of the judgment in
excess of the insurance policy. However, the court held that an insurance
carrier cannot be liable for a bad-faith refusal to settle if no offer to settle
within policy limits was made by the claimant.83
Beck v. Kelly can be clearly distinguished from Knobloch v. Royal
Globe Insurance Co. In Knobloch, the subsequent action was brought by
the policyholder. Several attempts to settle the suit had been made by the
plaintiff, but the insurer refused, in bad faith, to settle the claim within
policy limits. 84 However, in Beck, the plaintiff, who brought the badfaith refusal to settle action, was the very person who refused to settle.
Although the insurance carrier had made attempts to negotiate
settlement, the plaintiff neither accepted nor rejected the settlement
offers.85 It was because of the claimant's conduct that a jury rendered a
verdict in excess of the policy limit. Furthermore, the insurer generally
owes a duty to the policyholder to defend claims and settle suits in good
faith.86 Contractually, the insurer owes no duty to a third-party claimant
who is bringing a claim against the insured based on a previous
judgment.8 7
4.

A Different Interpretation of the Insurance Carrier's Bad-Faith
Refusal to Settle
Some courts do not require the satisfaction of all four elements in
order to bring a cause of action based on the insurer's bad-faith refusal
to settle. For instance, several courts have not required third-party
claimants 88 to make offers to settle within the insured's policy limit as a
prerequisite. 89 Additionally, courts have held that when an excess insurer
82.

Id.

83.

Id.

84.
85.

Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.2d 471, 476-77 (1976).
Beck v. Kelly, 323 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).

86. McMahon, supranote 14, at § 2.
87. See id.
88. Claimants are those parties who have claims or bring suit to collect against an insurer for
the wrongful conduct of a policyholder.
89. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Cas. Co., 416 F.2d 906, 910 (2d Cir. 1969); Gen. Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Am. Cas. Co., 390 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495, 504 (N.J. 1974); State Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Rowland, 427 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tenn. 1968); Alt v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 237 N.W.2d 706,
713 (Wis. 1976).
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exists, a policyholder is not judgment-proof 90 "[A]bsence of an offer to
settle within policy limits is not dispositive
of the question of bad faith
91
on the part of the primary insurer."
In General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. American
Casualty Co., the Florida District Court of Appeals qualified its position
in Beck v. Kelly and limited its holding.92 In this case, a claim was
brought by an excess insurance carrier against the primary insurer. A
neighbor sued John Brown, Jr., the policyholder, when his young child
drowned in Brown's pool. Brown was insured by General Accident's
(the "primary insurer") liability insurance coverage, for up to
$300,000. 9' Additionally, Brown had also obtained an excess liability
insurance policy for $1,000,000 from American Casualty (the "excess
insurer").94 The primary insurer had sole control of litigating and
defending the suit. The excess insurer did not take an active role in the
litigation. However, the excess
insurer notified the primary insurer and
95
informed.
kept
be
to
asked
During the course of discovery, the primary insurer learned that
Brown was likely to receive a potentially large judgment against him.
Furthermore, counsel and the primary insurer's local adjuster were
convinced that Brown would probably lose the suit with a substantial
plaintiffs verdict. Consequently, counsel for the primary insurer urged
his client, in a letter, to attempt to settle the case for the entire policy
96
limit.
Counsel for the plaintiffs in the underlying action wrote to counsel
for the primary insurer in an effort to settle the case. Plaintiffs made an
initial demand of $1,000,000, which was later reduced to $900,000.
Although the primary insurer's adjuster was asked to contact the excess
insurer to inquire whether it would contribute toward a settlement with
the plaintiffs if the primary insurer would utilize its entire policy, he
failed to do so. Instead, the primary insurer refused to negotiate further
90. "Judgment-proof' can be defined as being unable to satisfy a money judgment to pay
damages because the person does not own any property or enough property within the court's
jurisdiction for the judgment to be satisfied. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 861-62 (8th ed. 2004).
The person who is judgment-proof may also claim a benefit that his property is statutorily exempt.
Id.
91. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 390 So. 2d at 765.
92. Id. at 765-66.
93. Id. at 762.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 763. This was usual custom in the insurance industry. Id.
96. Id. In the letter, dated November 28, 1973, counsel wrote, "This case is taking overtones
of a very serious exposure and I suggest that you carry the matter at your full reserve of $300,000."
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because it felt that the original offer to settle was
with the plaintiffs
97
unreasonable.
The excess insurer demanded that the primary insurer attempt to
settle the case shortly before the case went to trial. However, the primary
insurer did not respond to the request, nor did it make a settlement offer
prior to the commencement of trial. At the start of trial, the primary
insurer finally made an offer to settle the case for a mere $25,000. 9' The
offer to settle, which was refused by the plaintiffs, was far less than the
original settlement demand and the policy limit.
The jury, as previously predicted, returned a verdict for the plaintiff
for a substantial sum of $700,000, an amount more than double the
primary insurance coverage. Though the matter was settled for
$690,000, the excess insurer was forced to pay $390,000. The primary
99
insurer was only obligated to pay the total amount of its policy limit.
Accordingly, the excess insurer filed suit against the primary
insurer alleging that the primary insurer's bad-faith refusal to negotiate
with the plaintiffs for a reasonable amount damaged them. The trial
court awarded the excess insurer $170,593.15, which included a jury
verdict of $100,000, as well as attorney's fees and prejudgment
interest. 100
The appellate court upheld the verdict.10 ' The Florida District Court
of Appeals reasoned that the cause of action for bad-faith refusal to settle
was created to protect insurance policyholders, who have no control over
the settlement, from excess judgment because of an insurance carrier's
willingness to risk going to trial instead of negotiating claims.' 0 2 The
court held that a primary insurer has a duty to negotiate the settlement of
10 3
claims in "good faith" because it controls the defense of the claim.
The excess insurer does not assume the same duties because it does not
have any control over the ensuing litigation. °4
The court further found that an offer to settle within policy limits by
a claimant was a factor to be considered but was not determinative of an
insurer's bad-faith refusal to settle. While an offer to settle within policy
limits may be an important factor in certain cases, it would not apply in
circumstances where there is an excess insurance policy at issue or
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100.

Id.

101.
102.
103.
104.

at 766.
Id.
Id.
at 764.
Id.
at 765.
Id.
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where the insured is not judgment-proof and is fully capable of paying
an excess judgment.' 05
If judicially-imposed sanctions had been within the realm of power
for the trial court at an early stage of litigation for the insurer's refusal to
settle within the policy limits, the insurer may have been deterred from
refusing to settle the claim and the subsequent litigation may have been
avoided. There have been many other instances where a court's time has
been wasted by needless litigation due to insurers' bad-faith refusals to
settle. 0 6 Although there is a fine line as to what constitutes bad faith in
the insurance settlement arena, it is arguable that the availability of
judicially imposed sanctions for trial judges may substantially deter
insurers from unreasonably refusing to settle where there is a clear
indication of liability.
B. Insurance CarriersShould Be ConsideredReal Partiesin Interest
Even Though They Are Not Named Partiesin Litigation
Rules of civil procedure across jurisdictions provide that all actions
must be brought in the name of the real party in interest. 17 The question
arises as to whether the insurance carrier should be considered the real
party in interest for all purposes of litigation when it is not, in fact, the
"named party." For example, according to the rules of civil procedure of
various jurisdictions, sanctions may only be imposed on parties.
However, the definition of parties is not always clear. Insurers, as a
result, could engage in misconduct and not be punished or sanctioned in
any way, because they are not the "named party" to the action. Courts
have split on this contention.

105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 26 (N.Y. 1993)
(recognizing that insurers have a duty to defend and a duty to settle in good faith where they
exercise exclusive control over such claims); Smith v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 697 N.E.2d 168, 171
(N.Y. 1998) (holding that insurers can be held liable for refusing a settlement offer in bad faith).
107. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-17 (West 2005) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.201 (West 2002) ("Every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 803.01 (1) (West 2001)
("No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until [certain conditions are met]."). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a), which provides that:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought; and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for
the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States.
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Rules of civil procedure in most jurisdictions do not allow the
imposition of sanctions on "non-parties."'08 Additionally, the rules do
not specify an exception for real parties in interest who may not be
named in the action. The fact that insurance carriers are in exclusive
control of the litigation has been overlooked in many jurisdictions.
Furthermore, although some courts have ruled that insurers are real
to bind the carriers by the
parties in interest, they have been reluctant
09
litigants.
named
the
bind
that
rules
same
The appellate court in David Leinoff Inc. v. 208 West 29th Street
Associates' 10 took a step in the right direction. There, the court held that
although insurance carriers are not parties, they are the real parties in
interest in a civil action."' If this contention is not accepted, it could
result in undesirable effects in our judicial system.11 2 Since the insurance
carrier has exclusive control over the litigation, the defendant
policyholder only serves as a mask during the trial, allowing the
insurance carrier to escape liability in the event of its misconduct.
In contrast, in Green v. Cunningham,13 it was not enough that the
insurance carrier had a duty to defend under its contract. The court
determined that the insurer did not have the right of action and was
entitled to no benefits from such right. Therefore, the court held it could
not be considered the real party in interest." 4
1. Analysis of Jurisdictions That Do Not Name Insurers as
Parties
In February 2000, Judge F. Dana Winslow of the Nassau County
Supreme Court recognized that the ability of insurance carriers to
continue their bad-faith litigation practices by refusing to settle could be
a grave problem. In Saastomoinen v. Pagano, 15 the trial court
recognized that there was no authority in the State of New York which
108. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Saastomoinen v. Pagano, 278 A.D.2d 218, 218-19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
110. 243 A.D.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). In this case, the plaintiff tenant filed a water
damage claim with its insurer because of a leak in the defendant's sprinkler system that the plaintiff
was leasing. A subrogation action was brought by the insurer against the defendant property owner
on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not comply with discovery demands, which resulted in
the complaint being dismissed. The court held, on appeal, the case should not have been dismissed
even if plaintiff did not comply with discovery demands, because the insurer was the real party in
interest and it was likely to suffer though the noncompliance was not its fault. Id.at 418-20.
111. See id.
112. See infra Part lV.B.
113. No. 15-79-16, 1980 WL 351942, at * 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 1980).
114. Id. at *2.
115. 183 Misc. 2d 781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 278 A.D.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
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could characterize an insurance carrier as a real party in interest where it
controlled the defense of claims against its policyholders." 16 However,
the court did identify that the insurer has an obligation to look out for its
own financial interests when making settlement decisions, as well as a
fiduciary duty of good faith to policyholders." 7 Thus, the court held that
an insurance carrier can appropriately be considered
a real party in
8
interest although it was not the named party."
As a result of this ruling, the trial court imposed sanctions on the
insurance carrier for frivolous misconduct because it continued its
defense in bad faith and failed to settle." 19 The trial court warned the
insurance carrier on three occasions prior to the commencement of trial
that the policyholder did not have a viable defense. Nonetheless, the
insurer disregarded the court's warnings and refused to make an effort to
settle the case.12 The insurer had been urged by the court to concede
liability. An attempt to settle the case would have resulted in the
reduction of damages. The trial court instructed the insurer that costs and
sanctions would be imposed on the insurance carrier, not the attorney or
the named party, if a jury returned a verdict finding the defendant
liable. '21

The appellate court disagreed with the trial court and reversed the
ruling. 122 In a very short decision, the court held that the trial court erred
in the imposition of sanctions on a non-party insurance carrier. 23 While
the court did not deny that the insurance carrier can be considered a real
party in interest for purposes of litigation, the statute that allowed for the
imposition of sanctions 24 was strictly construed by the appellate
116. Id. at783.
117. Id. at 785.
118.

Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 782.
121. Id.at 782-83.
122. Saastomoinen v. Pagano, 278 A.D.2d 218, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
123. Id. at 218-19.
124. The New York Rules provide:
The costs and fees awarded ... shall be assessed either against the party bringing the
action, claim, cross claim, defense or counterclaim or against the attorneyfor such party,
or against both, as may be determined by the court, based upon the circumstances of the
case. Such costs and fees shall be in addition to any other judgment awarded to the
successful party.
N.Y. C.P.L.R § 8303-a(b) (McKinney 1997) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1(a) (1998) (providing that "[t]he court, in its discretion, may award to any
party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court... costs in the form of
reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting
from frivolous conduct...").
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The court held that the language of the statute did not permit
the
26
imposition of sanctions of nonparties or real parties in interest.1
court.

2. Analysis of Jurisdictions That Name Insurers as Parties
In Patitucci v. Laverty,'27 the court ultimately reached the same
conclusion as Saastomoinen v. Pagano; however, the ruling had quite
different implications. In Patitucci, the trial court sanctioned an
insurance carrier, finding that it unreasonably refused to settle the
underlying case under Philadelphia General Civil Rule 170.128 The
insurance carrier claimed that the rule should be rendered
unconstitutional. In the initial settlement negotiations, the plaintiff in the
underlying suit made a settlement demand of $25,000. In return, the
defendant made a settlement offer of $2000.29 The court, in turn, made a
recommendation of $19,500 for settlement.1
125. See Saastomoinen, 278 A.D.2d at 218.
126. Id.
127. 576 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
128. Id. at 996. As quoted by the court, select sections of the Philadelphia General Civil Rule
170 provide:
A. "A party" under this regulation shall mean a named party and/or his insurance
carrier.
B. If [sic] any action tried by a jury in which the sole relief sought is money damages,
the Trial Judge on his/her own motion or on motion of any party may direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear for settlement conference.

E. Should the case be tried to verdict and prior to the verdict one of the parties has
agreed to accept or pay the amount recommended by the Trial Judge, then, if the final
judgment is twenty percent (20%) or more than the Trial Judge's evaluation and the
plaintiff has agreed to accept the Trial Judge's recommendation ... then the Trial Judge
may, within ten (10) days after the final judgment, schedule a hearing to determine
whether or not any sanctions shall be ordered against the party who had refused to
settle.
F. The Trial Judge shall determine whether or not sanctions shall be ordered under this
Rule.

H. In exercising discretion as to whether or not sanctions should be imposed under this
rule, the Trial Judge shall be guided by the following factors and criteria:

3. Whether there was any substantial merit to the plaintiffs claim or any substantial
merit to the defense of the action.
Id. at 995 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 994.
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After the insurance carrier was put on notice that the court would
impose Rule 170 sanctions, the insurer made a subsequent offer of
$10,000 to settle the case. Patitucci, the plaintiff, did not accept the offer
and stated that he would accept an offer in the amount of the court's
recommendation. Patitucci was awarded damages in an amount
exceeding $80,000. The parties subsequently settled the case in the
amount of $60,000-$35,000 in excess of the insurance policy coverage.
Consequently, the court imposed a Rule 170 sanction
on the insurer for
30
being unreasonable in its settlement negotiations. 1
However, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed the ruling,
holding that there was no evidence supporting the contention that the
insurer was unreasonable. 13 1 In fact, there was evidence to the contrary.
The insurer maintained throughout the duration of the case that the case
was defensible due to the Patitucci's contributory negligence. The court
noted that the purpose of Rule 170 was to "encourage settlement in cases
where, if the parties were reasonable, settlement in lieu of trial should
occur."' 132 The court's ruling did not render Rule 170 unconstitutional.

If New York State had enacted a comparable rule to Philadelphia
General Civil Rule 170, it is arguable that Saastomoinen v. Pagano
would have resulted in the opposite ruling. In Saastomoinen, the trial
court found that there was no defense to liability in the case.' 33 In
addition, the court warned that it would impose sanctions in the event a
verdict was rendered "finding the defendant solely liable.' 3 4 The trial
court was not reversed because the insurer attempted to make reasonable
settlement attempts, but because the New York statute relied upon by the
trial court did not grant the court power to impose sanctions on insurance
carriers, which are non-parties. 135 The appellate court did not appreciate
the materiality of finding the insurer to be the "real party in interest"
because such a ruling did not allow the imposition of sanctions under the
applicable statute. 136 If Saastomoinen had been adjudicated by the
Patitucci court, the sanctions would have been affirmed.

130. See id. at 994-96.
131. Id. at998.
132. Id.
133. Saastomoinen v. Pagano, 183 Misc. 2d 781, 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 278 A.D.2d
218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
134. Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
135. Saastomoinen v. Pagano, 278 A.D.2d 218, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
136. Id.; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1(b) (1998) ("The court, as
appropriate, may make such award of costs or impose such financial sanctions against either an
attorney or a party to the litigation or against both.") (emphasis added); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8303-a(b)
(McKinney 1997).
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III.

1551

INSURER'S GOOD-FAITH DUTY TO SETTLE CLAIMS

Insurance carriers, like any other business organization, are in
business to make profits.137 Insurance carriers earn such profits by
making safe investments in people who are risk-averse. Claims made
against their policyholders are not easily estimated or projected. 138 Thus,
when a claim is brought against one of their policyholders, the insurers'
purpose of making profits is frustrated. When third-party claimants file
suit, if the claims are viable, the insurance carrier chooses to undertake
the litigation of the case. Additionally, their obligation to settle cases
undermines their profit making scheme. The objective of the insurance
which it does by collecting
carrier is to reach maximum profitability,
139
premiums without making any payouts.
It is widely accepted that insurers have an obligation to settle within
policy limits when their policyholders are liable or the harm complained
of is clearly within the language of the policy.' 40 Refusing to settle
within policy limits in such situations is considered "bad faith" on the
part of the insurance carriers.' 41 Some commentators have even gone as
far as expecting insurance carriers to initiate settlement negotiations
even when the adversary has not made an offer to settle. 142 Though it is
unclear as to how far this fiduciary duty to settle in good faith should
extend, there is no doubt that the insurance carrier does have a duty to
settle within policy limits when an offer is made by the adversary. 43
Additionally, though most states agree that the duty does exist, whether
a cause of action is available to victims differs from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
A.

Cause ofAction for the ContractualBreach of a Duty to Settle

Historically, many jurisdictions treated insurance policies as
contracts and thus adhered to strict contract interpretation. 44 Under this
interpretation, the express terms of the insurance contract controlled any

137. See Economics of insurance, supra note 32.
138. Id.
139. See id
140. See supra note 46; see also Syverud, supra note 20, at 1116-17.
141. See Syverud, supra note 20, at 1116-17.
142. See McMahon, supra note 14, para. I (noting that courts are divided on whether an
insurer's good-faith duty mandates that it initiate a settlement negotiation).
143. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
144. Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad-Faith,Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenantof-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325,332 (1992).
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possible compensation of policyholders. 145 Moreover, policyholders
could only receive the limited damages available in breach of contract
claims plus any applicable interest.1 46 However, in the late 1800s, many
courts began to realize that labeling such actions as contractual claims
of
could lead to unjust results and determined that an "implied covenant
147
good faith and fair dealing" existed in every insurance contract.
Although not in the majority, Utah does abide by such a rule. 148 In
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,149 plaintiff Wayne Beck brought
suit against his automobile insurance carrier for a bad-faith refusal to
settle a claim for uninsured motorist benefits. Beck was the victim of a
hit-and-run accident when an automobile crashed into his car and
consequently injured his knee. The owner of the hit-and-run vehicle
maintained that her car had been stolen and
refuted responsibility for the
50
accident. Her insurer also denied liability.
Beck, whose vehicle was covered under the defendant insurer's
policy, had both no-fault and uninsured motorist insurance benefits.
While Beck was awaiting an answer from his claim against Kirkland, he
filed a claim against the defendant insurer for no-fault benefits. Beck
was paid $5000 for his medical expenses under the no-fault policy limit
and $1,299.43 for his lost wages. He then filed a claim against the
defendant for $20,000, the policy limit of the uninsured motorist
benefits. Beck's counsel contended that his damages were worth
significantly more than $20,000. However, the settlement
offer was
51
carrier.'
insurance
defendant
the
of
adjuster
an
by
rejected
Beck next filed a lawsuit against the insurance carrier. 152 In addition
to an ordinary breach of contract claim for failure to pay the uninsured
motorist benefits, Beck also alleged that the defendant insurer breached
its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by "acting in bad faith in
refusing to investigate the claim, bargain with [plaintiff], or settle the

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985) (holding that "the good

faith duty to bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing implied in all contracts and ...a violation of that duty gives rise to a claim for
breach of contract"). Cf Freeman v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 58 S.W.3d 590, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
("The duty of a liability insurer to defend pursuant to its agreement is determined by comparing the
language of the insurance contract and the allegations set forth in the petition.") (citing Moore v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
149. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
150. Id.at 796.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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claim .. ."'53 Beck sought damages in excess of his insurance policy
limits and sought punitive damages of $500,000. Beck's counsel
communicated with defendant insurer his willingness to settle the entire
suit for $20,000. However, the defendant rejected this offer and moved
to strike the prayer for punitive damages from the complaint because this
was simply a suit for breach of contract. The trial court granted the
motion and determined that the breach of contract and the breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims would be tried
separately. 154 Beck immediately revoked his previous offer to settle both
counts for $20,000 and offered to settle only the breach of contract claim
for that amount. 155
Beck wished to reserve the implied covenant claim and
separately.
it
try
Both parties agreed to settle the breach of contract claim for
$15,000. Beck sought to have the claim for an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing recognized as a tort claim and to have precedent from
the State of Oregon overruled. 156 However, although the court agreed
that in some situations policyholders should have some redress, the court
held that such a duty gave rise to a breach of contract claim. 157 The court
feared that adopting a tort remedy158would warp the principles of contract
law that were so widely accepted.
B. Cause ofAction for the Breach of Duty to Settle in Tort
A majority of jurisdictions recognize a tort cause of action against
insurance carriers for bad-faith refusals to settle or their denials of
payment for claims covered under insurance policies. 59 Policyholders
may benefit more by having a tort cause of action instead of a cause of
action in contract. Damages for causes of action in contract are limited
compared to damages arising for a cause of action in tort. Minnesota
applies a two-prong test to the tort action of the insurer's bad-faith
refusal to settle: An insurance carrier cannot be held liable unless it can
be established (1) that the policyholder is "clearly liable" and (2) that the
153. Id. at 797.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 798.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1036, 1038 (Cal. 1973) (en banc);
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Idaho 1986); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (Nev. 1975); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319
(Ohio 1983); Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla. 1977); McCullough
v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1990).
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insurer had a "good faith [belief] upon reasonable grounds" that
16
effecting a settlement for the amount proposed would be excessive. 0
In Northfield Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance
Co., 61 a primary insurer was sued by the policyholder's excess
insurance carrier for not effectuating a settlement in good faith. The
underlying suit was comprised of two claims: one for medical
malpractice against a hospital and the plaintiff's doctor, and another for
products liability against the manufacturer of the product used in the
medical procedure. 62 The parties to the litigation were the primary and
excess insurance carriers for Intertech, the manufacturer.163 Both
Intertech and the defendant, its primary insurance carrier, assessed that
there was a seventy-five to ninety percent chance that the company
would not be held liable at trial. Accordingly, they rejected a one million
dollar settlement offer. However, all parties conceded that defendant's
policy limit would be exceeded by several million dollars if damages
were ultimately awarded.164
After the trial was bifurcated into separate actions, the hospital
settled the medical malpractice action. The plaintiff in the underlying
suit for products liability then made a settlement offer for a mere
$50,000. 165 However, defendant refused to offer any amount for
settlement and refused to participate in any further settlement
negotiations. Upon concluding the liability phase at trial, the jury found
Intertech liable and a settlement for $2.7 million ensued. The court held
that although defendant acted in bad faith 166 in its assessment of
damages and refusal to settle, it could not be held liable because earlier
investigations
verified that the policyholder, Intertech, was not "clearly
167
liable."

160. Northfield Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Minn. 1996).
161. 535 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. 1996).
162. Id.at 58.
163. Id. Defendant St. Paul, the primary insurer, had a policy limit of $1 million and plaintiff
Northfield had a policy limit of $5 million in excess of the primary insurance policy.
164. Id. at 59.
165. Id. This amount was only five percent of the primary insurance policy coverage.
166. The court noted that, since a prior assessment of damages in the event of a liability verdict
was significantly greater than the amount covered under the primary insurance policy, and since the
differential between the settlement offer and the eventual judgment was so great, the refusal to settle
constituted bad faith. Id. at 61.
167. Id. The court stated that the excess insurer's claim was essentially a claim of negligence in
considering a reasonable settlement offer against the insurer. Id.In adopting the bad faith standard,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota specifically rejected the negligence standard in such causes of
action. Id. at 63.
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C. "Bad Faith" in the Insurance Context
The duty of good faith is generally implied in every insurance
contract in the context of defending and settling claims. Different
jurisdictions apply a variety of public policy reasons for imputing a duty
of good faith into insurance contracts. For example, Illinois courts have
recognized that the duty of good faith is implicated because the insurer
exercises exclusive control over the litigation settlement negotiations. In
Haddick v. Valor Insurance,168 the court noted that the purpose of the
implied good faith duty to settle was instituted to protect insurance
policyholders from being exposed to liability in excess of the policy
limits because of an insurer's decision to "gamble" with the
policyholder's fate. 169 If the insurer does breach the good-faith duty to
settle, the insurance carrier must be held liable for the entire judgment
against the insured, even if the amount exceeds the policy limit. 70
Some courts have recognized that an implied good faith duty to
settle must be imposed because policyholders purchase insurance for
"peace of mind," in addition to their desire to ensure sufficient funds to
cover their liability in the event of an accident. In Campbell v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 7' the court noted that, in addition to
recovering the excess judgment itself from the insurance carrier, an
aggrieved policyholder may also recover tort damages for emotional
distress and punitive damages as a result of the insurance carrier's
breach of duty to settle in good faith.1 72 Additionally, some courts have
reasoned that if insurers are not subject to "bad faith" claims in tort, they
would have little incentive to engage in faithful and prompt attempts to
settle claims because they would only be required to pay the upper limit
of the insurance policies. 73 In effect, insurance carriers would be
encouraged to opportunistically breach their insurance contract because
they would not be subject to further liability in the event of their
74
breach. 1

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
Hanover
174.

735 N.E.2d 132 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 134.
Id.
840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Id.at 139.
See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1972); Bibeault v.
Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 318-19 (R.I. 1980).
See supranotes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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ECONOMIC INCENTIVES NOT TO SETTLE VERSUS JUDICIAL
INTEREST IN WEEDING OUT NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIMS

It is widely accepted that insurance carriers may often have a
tendency to conduct business in bad faith. Countless internet websites
are dedicated to the fight against bad-faith insurers.' 7 5 The FBIC 7 6 has
even ranked insurers in its "Hall of Shame" according to their bad-faith
practices of refusing to pay claims. 177 However, the insurance industry
has expressed great opposition to the availability of bad-faith claims
against insurance carriers.178 As a result of the bad-faith breach of duty
to settle cases, the insurance industry may have responded with hikes in
insurance premiums. 179 This is circular reasoning, however, because
there would be a significantly lesser implementation of bad-faith claims
if insurance carriers would abide by their express and implied
contractual duties.

A.

What Do They Get Out of It?: Reasons Insurance
CarriersAre Reluctant to Settle

Insurance carriers have several incentives not to settle. First,
insurance carriers must maintain a certain reputation. 180 In order to do
81
so, they cannot yield to everyone that brings claims against them.'
Second, they also seek to protect their finances against wrongful
183
claims. 182 Insurers often take advantage of the litigation process,

175. See, e.g., FBIC: Fight Bad Faith Insurance Carriers, FBIC Ranks Insurers Non-Payment
of Claims and Improper Practices; http://www.badfaithinsurance.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter FBIC Ranks Insurers]; Robert W. Battin, Insurance Bad Faith Claims Specialist,
http://www.badfaithclaims.com/ibfc_main.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
176. Fight Bad Faith Insurance Company. See FBIC Ranks Insurers, supra note 175.
177. See FBIC: Fight Bad Faith Insurance Companies, "FBIC Ranking 100": Ranking Group
Insurers Claims Payment Records, http://www.badfaithinsurance.org/indexdetaillist.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2006). The "FBIC Ranking 100" also ranks the insurers engaged in good faith
practices. Id.
178. See, e.g., Ron Lent, Industry Speaks out Against Third-Party Bad-Faith Claims Bills, A
REPORT ON CLAIMS (David Morse & Associates, Glendale, CA), May 1997, available at
http://www.davidmorse.com/archives2/1997-may-aroc.pdf.
179. See id
180. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 237; see also Syverud, supra note 20, at 1161-62.
181. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 237; Syverud, supra note 20, at 1161-62.
182. See Ellison, supra note 22, at 237.
183. See id. at 249-53; see also Anderson & Fournier, supra note 48, at 398 ("Insurance
companies may violate a policyholder's reasonable expectations of coverage for purely financial
reasons. This is because insurance companies profit by prolonging a coverage dispute rather than
paying a claim--even when they know the claim is valid.").
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knowing that they have nothing to lose because their liability is capped
at their policy limits.1 84 As a result, policyholders are the ones at risk of

paying an amount in excess of the capped amount.1 85 This leads to great
dilemmas; the policyholder is unprotected and helpless when the
insurance carrier unreasonably refuses to pay claims.186 Third, insurance
carriers are fully aware that policyholders are often ignorant to the inner
workings of the insurance industry and that they 1do
not have the
87
information, money, or resources that the carriers have.
Not only do insurers profit from collecting policy premiums while
refusing to pay claims, but they also profit from litigation.188 When
insurance carriers refuse to pay claims, it may often be for purely
economic reasons. 8 9 Generally, the money collected by insurance
carriers is invested and remains there until the suit is completed.1 90 By
not settling the cases at the onset, the insurer collects interest and profits
from its investments.191
Additionally, insurers' litigation costs are often lower than one
might think because they repeatedly use the same resources in every
comparable claim that may arise. 92 While insurance carriers are
profiting, the insured may be subject to excess liability. This may result
in a verdict in excess of the insurance coverage where the policyholder
will be responsible for paying any amount over the policy limit.
B. An Interest in JudicialEfficiency
According to FRCP Rule 1, federal civil trials are supposed to be
"just, speedy, and efficient."' 93 Most jurisdictions have a mirror image of
this rule. 194 However, the refusal of insurance carriers to settle, which
184. See, e.g., Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers' Professional
Responsibilities:Part I-Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REv. 599, 632 (2000).
185. See Kathryn A. Sampson, The Mouse in the Annotated Bibliography: An Insurance Law
Primer,2000 ARK. L. NOTES 85, 107.
186. See Anderson & Fournier, supranote 38, at 336-37.
187. Id. at401-06.
188. Id. at 398-401.

189. Id. at 398.
190. Id; see also THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE: How INSURERS CREATE VALUE FOR
SHAREHOLDERS 35-40, 37-38 (2001), availableat http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwsfilpr

.nsf/vwFilebylDKEYLu/BBER-5B4K5E/$FILE/Theeconomics

of insurance en.pdf (last visited

Sept. 15, 2007).
191. See Anderson & Foumier, supranote 38, at 398.

192. Insurance carriers are sometimes defined as "institutional litigators," meaning they are
regularly and extensively involved in litigation. Id. at 383, 407-08.
193.
194.

See FED. R. Civ.P. 1.
See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
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creates endless litigation, impedes this effort. The continuation of the
insurance carriers' defense, though not viable, could potentially set off a
chain of events that adversely affects the judicial system as a whole. 195 If
the insurers were to directly pay out the meritorious claims, litigation for
that particular case would cease. However, when they refuse to do so, it
needlessly prolongs litigation. As a result, parties must engage in
additional discovery because the case was not disposed of as early as it
could have been.
Trial can be very time consuming since both parties must prove
their legal theories.' 96 Even where the defendant knows he is clearly
liable, he is powerless to settle the claim if the insurance carrier does not
concede liability; it is the insurance carrier who is in sole control of the
litigation. 197 Juries must deliberate and render a verdict, which can be a
lengthy process. In such cases, it may be likely that the jury will return 98
a
verdict for the plaintiff who has brought suit against the policyholder.'
It is also very likely that the damages awarded will be greater than the
insurance policy.' 99 As a result, in some instances the verdict may be
questioned by motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If such
motion fails, because insurers are only responsible for the monetary
limits of the policy, policyholders will be legally bound to pay the
excess.

200

As soon as policyholders realize that their insurance carrier could
have settled within policy limits before trial, they may sue for damages
in excess of the policy because they have been wrongly subjected to
such damages. 20 1 This will result in another trial, further lengthening the
ordeal. Depending on the verdict rendered in this subsequent action,
parties may choose to appeal. This could possibly result in years of

195. See supra Part II.A.2.
196. See Douglas N. Walton, A Pragmatic Model of Legal Disputation, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 711, 714 (1998) ("Central to the fair trial is that there is a conflict of opinions that should be
resolved in a dialogue where both sides bring forward the strongest evidence to support their
contentions.").
197. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
198. The National Center for State Courts conducted a study to develop a profile of litigation
and jury trials in state courts. Its findings for 1992 concluded that although plaintiffs won forty-nine
percent of all jury cases, in automobile negligence cases, plaintiffs won sixty percent of the time.
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An EmpiricalPerspective, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 849, 851-52 (1998) (citing Brian Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil
Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 223 (1996)).

199.
200.
201.

See supra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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superfluous, costly, and nonsensical litigation that could have been
avoided from the very beginning.
If the trial court had the power to sanction insurance carriers for
their bad-faith refusals to settle, the carriers would feel obliged to take
part in settlement negotiations. Reaching a settlement in actions where
there is no viable defense would substantially reduce the number of
cases that go to trial. Courts would be relieved of the burden of hearing
cases based on an insurer's refusal to settle meritorious claims. Though
insurers believe that their decision to litigate may deter third-party
claimants20 2 from bringing complaints against them and their
policyholders, this contention is illogical. The case may result in a
higher jury verdict than the possible settlement.20 3 As such, claimants
will be encouraged to bring claims, whether meritorious in nature or not.
Consequently, insurers are encouraging the very behavior they wish to
deter.
V.

CONCLUSION

The most important-and maybe sole-reason most policyholders
obtain insurance policies is to ensure indemnification for contingent
harms they may suffer in the event the insured engages in any wrongful
conduct covered under the policy. 204 Unlike ordinary contracts, an
"opportunistic breach" is a fallacy in the insurance context because the
only party benefiting from such a breach is the insurer.20 5 Nevertheless,
insurers continue to breach their contracts by refusing to defend claims
in good faith and failing to effectuate good faith settlements even when
their policyholders are clearly liable.
Generally, insurance carriers are less inclined to breach their duty
to defend than their duty to settle a claim in good faith.20 6 Furthermore,
the duties to defend and to effectuate a good-faith settlement are only
owed to policyholders, not to third-party claimants.20 7 Various standards
and tests are applied by courts of different jurisdictions in allowing badfaith claims against insurers.20 8 The availability of remedies for
insurance policyholders may seem to be beneficial at first glance.
202. Third party claimants in the insurance context refer to persons who bring claims against
an insurance carrier due to the wrongful conduct of the insurer's policyholder.
203. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
205. See Anderson & Faumier, supra note 38, at 377-78.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 49-72.
207. See supra Part II.A.3.
208. Seesupra Part III.
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However, the remedies can prove to be detrimental because
policyholders are forced to expend much time and money litigating suits
that would have never occurred had the insurance carriers conformed to
their duties in good faith. As a result, the court system is also tied up in
the litigation of unnecessary claims.
At least one court has attempted to solve this problem in hopes of
relieving the judicial inefficiency created by such a system. However,
this court's efforts have been rejected. 0 9 This Note contends that the
court's novel attempt to solve this problem should be reconsidered. The
Nassau County Supreme Court, in Saastoinoinen v. Pagano,21 ° correctly
recognized that insurance carriers should be considered "parties" for
purposes of imposition of sanctions because they are the real parties in
interest. The recognition of insurers as "parties" for all purposes of
litigation would greatly relieve the judicial system of unwarranted and
avoidable litigation. The Saastomoinen court was not troubled by the
fact that the insurance carrier was not a "named party," recognizing the
important role the insurer played and the control the carrier maintained
over the litigation of the claim.
Allowing courts to sanction insurers in the underlying suit, where
the insurer is not a named party, would greatly reduce, and possibly
eliminate, the number of bad-faith lawsuits against insurers. Aggrieved
policyholders would not have to rely on bringing subsequent bad-faith
lawsuits, whether in contract or in tort, because the judicially-imposed
sanctions would most likely pressure insurers to settle. The "just,
speedy, and efficient" 211 determination of civil actions in the insurance
context can become a reality, and no longer a myth.
Imposing sanctions on insurance carriers is the correct action for
courts to take when dealing with insurers who act in bad faith. Insurance
carriers are the real parties in interest, in the sense that they control the
litigation process.21 2 Policyholders and attorneys should not be the only
"parties" subject to sanctions when their names are just mere masks
behind which the insurers hide in order to escape certain procedural
rules.
The American judicial system should not endorse such an
inconsistency. Rules of civil procedure and the courts interpreting them
are ignoring the role insurance carriers play in the litigation of claims
against their policyholders. While most courts recognize that insurance
209.
210.
211.
212.

See supra notes 115-126 and accompanying text.
183 Misc. 2d 781 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000), rev'd, 278 A.D.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
See FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
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carriers are real parties in interest, they strictly construe rules of civil
procedure, allowing the imposition of sanctions against only "named"
parties. Insurance carriers, who are not named parties, should not hide
behind policyholders and continue to engage in wrongful litigation
practices. However, by only sanctioning named parties in such actions,
courts are encouraging insurance carriers to continue to act in bad faith.
Andrea Yoon*
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